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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Subject: C.I.G. Policy on Security Clearance of Personnel.

The following recommendations are submitted in connection with comments received from the Department of State, Navy Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding suggested amendments to C.I.G. ■

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1. The Chief of Naval Intelligence recommends that paragraph 7, page 3, be amended to provide for a review of all reports of investigations by a screening committee to consist of one representative each from the State Department; Military Intelligence Division, G-2; Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-2 and then the final review by the Security Officer of the Central Intelligence Group. Paragraph 7 in its original form provides for the review of investigative reports by the Security Officer of C.I.G. It is believed that the proposed additional review by a screening committee is neither necessary nor desirable because:

a. Review of the investigative reports by the Security Officer, C.I.G. will accomplish the primary purpose of the provision in question, which is to permit of extraction from the reports of certain pertinent information desired for C.I.G. files. It is for the further purpose of enabling the Security Officer to familiarize himself with the contents of the reports so that he will be in a position to brief the Director of Central Intelligence regarding the acceptability of nominees to the C.I.G.

b. The only reports in which all the departments have an interest are those in which a nominee fails to meet the requirements of the directive and an exception is requested. Paragraph 13 of C.I.G. ■ provides that exceptions may be granted on the basis of unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member departments of the Central Intelligence Group. Thus, the reports of investigations will be available to all departments in such cases.

c. It is believed that the requirements set up in C.I.G. ■

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for the investigation and clearance of individuals for assignment to the C.I.G. will permit each department to make the proper determination as to an individual's eligibility and that a review of investigative reports of one department by the other departments would result in delaying the clearance and would serve no useful purpose. It is recommended that the suggested amendment, paragraph 7, not be concurred in and further, that paragraph 7 be retained in its present form.

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2. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Department of State suggests that paragraph 13 be amended to require only the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and the department nominating the person for duty with the Central Intelligence Group in order to effect an exception to any of the provisions of C.I.G. Paragraph 13 in its original form required the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member departments of the Central Intelligence Group to effect exceptions. This provision is a saving clause that permits exceptions in cases where extenuating circumstances may make it desirable to utilize an individual's services even though the individual does not meet with the set standards. It is believed that all member departments of the Central Intelligence Group are entitled to knowledge of any exceptions being made on individuals nominated for duty with the Central Intelligence Group. It is, therefore, recommended that the suggested amendment to paragraph 13 not be concurred in and further that the provision in question be retained in its original form.

3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation suggests that the provision that a minimum of ten (10) years honorable government service, there being no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to integrity, be accepted as a basis for clearance may make possible the entry of unsatisfactory persons into the employment of the Central Intelligence Group. It is stated that there are many persons who have been in government employment for a period of ten (10) years or more and have what appears to be unblemished records insofar as integrity and loyalty are concerned but who do not make satisfactory employees for the Central Intelligence Group from the security standpoint. It is believed that there is a security danger unless an adequate check is made to determine the existence of any derogatory information that may have developed subsequent to the date of any existent investigative report or during the entire period of the individual's government employment. To provide for an adequate check, it is recommended that there be incorporated in paragraph 9 a final sentence worded as follows:

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"In each case of clearance based on a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation or on the basis of a minimum of ten (10) years honorable government service, a check of the appropriate records in the Department of State; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Military Intelligence Service, War Department and Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department will be made prior to the issuance of a clearance certificate."

4. As a result of further careful consideration of this directive, it is recommended that two other minor changes be effected which, it is believed, will clarify the intent of two particular provisions thereof. The suggested changes are as follows:

a. Page 4, paragraph 8 a (2) include after "Federal Bureau of Investigation" the words in parentheses "(to include fingerprint files)."

b. Page 5, paragraph 11, change lines 1 and 2 to read "All military and civilian personnel assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence Group will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy which will be administered by the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative."

The change suggested in a. above is believed necessary to insure that all agencies will request the F.B.I. to effect a fingerprint check as well as the usual records check. The change recommended in b. above is considered necessary to clearly indicate that the provisions of C.I.G. apply only to the personnel actually assigned to or attached for duty with the C.I.G.

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Acting Chief, Central Planning Staff

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